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The post-Independence history of India underlines the fact that while wars were continuously imposed on the nation, the political leadership refused to learn any lesson from such wars and remained obsessed with pacifism and passivity. It may be said that though the expenditure on armed forces have increased and India has taken several strides in developing nuclear power, missiles, space-crafts and critical arsenals, the political leadership have failed to evolve a pro-active strategic policies. While India celebrates tenth anniversary of victory in Kargil War over Pakistan, a reassessment of the events which unfolded thereafter may point to the fact that a large hearted approach aimed at generating goodwill and friendship with Pakistan has failed to yield dividends. The soft approach towards Pakistan has culminated Pakistani attacks like in Kargil infiltration and 26/11 Mumbai terror attack.
The Kargil War as it is generally referred to was fought relatively recently between May-July 1999. Although it remained a localized affair, the war was fought very intensely and the world witnessed it with bated breath fearing the conflagration of a full fledged war between the worlds's two nuclear States. It was caused by the ongoing cross-border terrorism sponsored by Pakistan under its scheme of waging proxy war against India. Pakistan has been aiding and abetting cross-border terrorism in India through its intelligence wing ISI (Inter Services Intelligence) and Army by allowing the jihadis to run training camps in Pakistan and PoK, the area under its control, by arming them to infiltrate into India. The Kargil war was a pre-planned attempt to stage a massive infiltration into India in large numbers by Pakistani army and jihadi groups for capturing military posts from India in the border area. While the political leadership of Pakistan pleaded that it was unaware of the entire plan, the military leadership i.e. General Pervez Musharraff insisted that the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharief had prior information about the Kargil operation. The blame game between the Pakistan military and its political dispensation has further eroded that country's political credibility internationally.
The 1999 confrontation came to be termed as Kargil war because the hostilities remained confined mainly to Kargil district of Jammu & Kashmir. It was fought at high altitudes and in inaccessible mountainous terrain having freezing temperatures in the range of -40 °C. For decades it was a general practice that with the onset of extreme winter condition, Indian and Pakistani forces would withdraw from their forward posts during winter and reoccupy them in the spring. In early May 1999, the Pakistani army moved ahead in a bid to capture around 130 posts on Indian side. The infiltration was carried out by Pakistan's elite Super Services Group, four to seven battalions of Northern Light Infantry, Afghan mercenaries and Kashmiri militants. On coming to know of the infiltration, the Government of India responded with "Operation Vijay" after mobilising around 2,00,000 troops on the border area. Most of the posts were located at the high altitudes thus making it very difficult to evict the occupiers. On most of the hill top posts like Tiger Hills, fierce hand to hand combat took place under heavy artillery fire. Air strikes under the code name "Operation Safed Sagar" were also launched at high altitude and laser guided bombs were used to attack the enemy positions. It is estimated that in air strikes alone around 700 infiltrators were killed. In two months time India regained control over the most of the military posts stealthily occupied by Pakistani army. Adverse international opinion and war losses finally forced Nawaz Sharief to declare withdrawal of Pakistani troops. United Jihadist Council which voted against the proposed retreat continued to fight the Indian army but they were finally defeated and evicted from the Drass sub sector, their last stronghold. The fighting came to an end on 26th July 1999. The day is celebrated as Kargil Vijay Divas.
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